




Comparative Analysis of Specific
Elements in United States and Canadian
Unfair Trade Lawt
The development of a bilateral trading arrangement that would create a North
American free trade area dominated the Canadian and United States Govern-
ments' international trade agendas in the late 1980s. 1 This goal was second only
to the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations
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1. So high a priority was placed on the creation of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that during
the annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, both James Baker III, U.S.
Secretary of Treasury, and Michael Wilson, Canadian Minister of Finance, deferred the crucial task
of reviving the delicate global financial system in order to negotiate the FTA. See ASSESSING THE
CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (Murray G. Smith & Frank Stone eds., 1987); REPORTS OF
THE TwENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN TRADE POLICY, THE FREE
TRADE DEBATE (1989); Paul Wonnacott, The United States and Canada: The Quest for Free Trade,
16 INST. FOR INT'L ECON. (Mar. 1987); Shelley P. Battram, Canada-United States Trade Negotia-
tions: Continental Accord or a Continent Apart?, 22 INT'L LAW. 345 (1988).
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under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 2
Both governments thought it in their mutual interests to negotiate a far-reaching,
bilateral free trade arrangement that could also provide a model for the ongoing
Uruguay Round negotiations. 3 Preferring something less than the political and
economic integration that is the goal of the European Community, the United
States and Canada successfully negotiated an agreement that created the largest
free trade area in history.4
Unlike previous arrangements of this type, the two governments did not ne-
gotiate a common code to regulate unfair trade practices between themselves. 5
Rather, as the deadline for the expiration of fast-track negotiating authority6 in
the United States rapidly approached and threatened to prevent a successful
conclusion to the negotiations, both governments agreed to a procedural interim
arrangement. In lieu of an arrangement to discipline subsidies, which had eluded
the negotiators, the two governments agreed to retain their unfair trade laws and
to negotiate, over a five-year period, a common solution to the issue of govern-
ment subsidies. 7 During the transition period, binational panels of nongovern-
2. Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187. An overview of the GAIT
and its effect on multilateral trade relations is found in MARTINUS NUHOFF, TRADE POLICIES FOR A
BETTER FUTURE, "THE LEUTWILER REPORT," THE GATT AND THE URUGUAY ROUND (1987) [here-
inafter THE LEUTWILER REPORT]; RICHARD W.T. POMFRET, UNEQUAL TRADE (1988); JOHN H. JACK-
SON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1986) and the
June 1991 Supplementary Memorandum to that text.
3. The Uruguay Round, initiated by the Contracting Parties to the GAIT in 1986, is a com-
prehensive multilateral effort to negotiate improvements in the current GATT system. See generally
Jeffrey J. Schott, The Global Trade Negotiation: What Can Be Achieved, 29 INST. FOR INT'L ECON.
(Sept. 1990); THE LEUTWILER REPORT, supra note 2; UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1991
TRADE POLICY AGENDA AND 1990 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE
TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM (1991) [hereinafter USTR REPORT].
4. For the definitions of customs unions and free trade areas, see GATT, supra note 2, art.
XXIV(8)(a), (8)(b). For a text of the FrA, see Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement,
Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (1988)). See also HOUSE Doc. No.
100-216 for texts of the FTA, the implementing legislation, and the Statement of Administrative
Action. For a detailed survey of the FTA, see Stewart Baker & Shelley Battram, The Canada-United
States Free Trade Agreement, 23 INT'L LAW. 37 (1989); MARJORIE BOWKER, ON GUARD FOR THEE
(1988); RICHARD LIPSEY & ROBERT YORK, EVALUATING THE FREE TRADE DEAL (1988); DEP'T OF
COMM., SUMMARY OF THE U.S.-CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (Feb. 1988).
5. Traditionally, free trade areas have developed harmonized tariffs and trade regulations
among the members, while each member has retained its individual tariff and trade laws to be applied
to third countries; see, e.g. Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area Agreement, 5 I.L.M. 305
(1966), and European Free Trade Area Association (EFTA), 5 I.L.M. 784 (1966). The only restraint
on Australia and New Zealand's relationships with third countries came under the auspices of rules
of origin. See REPORTS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN
TRADE POLICY, supra note 1.
6. Fast-track negotiating authority has its genesis in sections 2(a) and 3(c) of the Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 2503(a), (b) (1988). Under these provisions, the President must
consult with Congress during the negotiation of a trade agreement and present the final agreement to
Congress for a vote on the agreement as a whole, without amendments, within sixty or ninety days,
if certain other conditions are met. See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 377 (1991).
7. The FTA is implemented into U.S. law at 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (1988). Article 1907 of the
U.S.-Canada FIA establishes a bilateral working group whose primary goal is to develop more
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ment experts will determine whether the unfair trade laws of each country are
being administered in accordance with the applicable country's laws."
For both governments, the Uruguay Round has been the principal forum for
the debate about discipline on unfair trade practices since the conclusion of the
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA). 9 Unless significant progress
is made in these talks in the near future, it will be increasingly important to shift
from the multilateral to the bilateral negotiation of improved "rules of the game"
as the December 31, 1993, deadline imposed by the FTA approaches.
The following five-step analysis of the existing features of each country's
framework for trade regulation seeks to demonstrate the broad common ground
shared by both nations in the administration of their current unfair trade regimes.
First, the article examines the international obligations that are the basis of the
FTA partners' trade laws. Second, it presents an analysis of the substantive
refinements that each country has made to the concepts of subsidies, material
injury, and public interest. Third, it focuses on the procedures and practices of
each country that implement the substantive laws and regulations. Fourth, it
studies the use of negotiated settlements in each country as a tool for enforcement
rather than as a means to evade unfair trade laws, as is the case in most of the
world. Finally, it analyzes the different standards of judicial review in trade cases
in each FTA country.
I. Sources of Domestic Trade Law
Canadian and American trade laws flow from the treaty obligations undertaken
by both Canada and the United States as contracting parties to the GATT and as
signatories to the Tokyo Codes on subsidies' and antidumping. 1 As such, both
countries have enacted domestic legislation designed to adhere to these instru-
ments. These codes and their implementing legislation were established to dis-
effective rules and disciplines over the use of government subsidies and to develop a substitute
system of rules to address the issue of unfair pricing (dumping). Article 1906 sets a five-year deadline
for the implementation of the rules, with an automatic extension for two more years. Failure to agree
to implement a new regime after seven years will allow either government to terminate the FTA on
six months' notice.
8. Chapters 18 and 19 of the FTA provide several mechanisms for the further elaboration of the
agreement, as well as for the resolution of disputes. In particular, the article 1907 working group (see
supra note 7) will monitor problems under chapter 19 and recommend improvement, and develop a
new system to discipline subsidies and dumping. During the transition period to the new system,
article 1902(1) permits each country to retain the right to continue to apply its own domestic trade
law, which is to include all relevant statutes, legislative history, regulations, administrative practice,
and judicial precedent. In addition, article 1904 creates a unique binational system for the review by
five-member panels of nongovernment experts from each nation of antidumping and countervailing
duty determinations made in each country affecting the other country's goods. This review is made
in lieu of a review by the relevant courts in each country.
9. See USTR REPORT, supra note 3, on the continuing implementation of the FTA.
10. See Agreement on the Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the
GATT (GAIT Subsidies Code), Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619.
11. See Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the GAIT (GATT Antidumping
Code), Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4914, T.I.A.S. No. 9650.
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cipline the use of unfair trade laws as protectionist, nontariff trade barriers by
national governments.
The GATT codes form the basis of American and Canadian unfair trade laws.
Canada incorporated these measures in the Special Imports Measures Act 12
(SIMA); the United States implemented them in the Trade Agreements Act of
197913 (1979 Trade Act). At a cursory level both systems are similar, employing
language analogous to that found in the Tokyo Codes. The codes, however, are
sufficiently vague to permit differences in the good faith interpretation and im-
plementation of their requirements.
Indeed, both systems call for a determination of an unfair trade practice that
causes or threatens to cause material injury to a domestic industry or group of
industries before a duty becomes assessable. ' 4 Consistent therewith, both coun-
tries provide a mandatory two-track, quasi-judicial, administrative proceeding to
determine whether a domestic industry has been injured by an unfair trade
practice. 15
In the United States, the Import Administration of the International Trade
Administration (ITA) in the Department of Commerce determines the extent or
margin of a subsidy or sale at less than fair value. ' 6 The U.S. International Trade
Commission (ITC) makes material injury determinations. Under the Canadian
system, the determination of subsidy or sales at less than fair value is made by
the Assessment Programs Division of the Department of National Revenue,
Customs and Excise (C&E). The Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CIT'')
conducts the material injury investigation. 17
II. Substantive Law
While there is a broad consensus that certain international trade practices are
unfair and therefore should be controlled or regulated to some extent, there has
been considerable controversy in the GATT during the current Uruguay Round of
12. R.S.C. ch. S-15 (1985). Administrative procedures governed by the Special Import Mea-
sures Regulations.
13. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (codified as amended in scattered sections of titles 5, 13,
19, and 26 U.S.C.). Administrative procedures are governed by 19 C.F.R. § 200ff.
14. See, e.g., GATT" Subsidies Code, supra note 10, arts. 2, 6(2), and annex.
15. While such a bifurcated system is GATIT consistent, it is by no means mandatory. In fact,
Australia and the EEC employ equally GATT consistent one-step investigations. For an insightful
commentary on the advantages of the respective approaches, see ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE
427-28 (John H. Jackson & Edwin A. Vermulst eds., 1989).
16. For a comprehensive discussion of the administration of U.S. antidumping and countervail-
ing duty laws, see Stephen J. Powell, Craig R. Giesse, & Craig L. Jackson, Current Administration
of U.S. Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws: Implications for Prospective U.S.-Mexico Free
Trade Talks, 11 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 177 (1990).
17. R.S.C. ch. S-15 (1985) §§ 31(1) & 42(l); 19 C.F.R. §§ 353, 355 (1988); 19 U.S.C.
§ 2251(b)(1) (1988).
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negotiations, as well as in the previous multilateral trade negotiation rounds,
over what constitutes an unfair trade practice.' 8 The GATT, as interpreted
through the GAT' Subsidies Code and the GATT Antidumping Code, is far from
a complete code of conduct. 19 Many countries have enjoyed a wide latitude to
interpret the GATT to justify trade distorting measures. Canada and the United
States are not exceptions. While both nations profess to adhere to GATT ideol-
ogy and have employed much of its language in their domestic legislation, some
peculiarities remain, which the following sections explore.
A. SUBSIDIES
1. International Law
Perhaps the biggest irritant in Canadian-American trade relations in the past
decade has been the issue of subsidies. Indeed, Canada's perceived overuse of
subsidies is likely one of the main reasons behind American insistence that
Canada be included in American unfair trade law under the FTA.2 °
Subsidies were a difficult issue in the Tokyo Round negotiations. Subsidies
still remain controversial instruments of commercial policy. Although the GAT!
Subsidies Code provides an illustrative list of export subsidies, the code fails to
provide a precise definition of what constitutes a countervailable subsidy. 2' This
problem continues today and is particularly acute in the area of agricultural trade,
where a failure to negotiate satisfactory limitations on subsidies threatens to
prevent the conclusion of the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations.
The decision of whether subsidies are countervailable depends on the
perception of the proper role of government in society. As a result, the decision
prompting a countervailing duty response is a determination that a foreign
producer is receiving an unfair competitive advantage through an improper
government subsidy.
22
A principal difficulty today lies in distinguishing between domestic subsidies
that divert and distort otherwise natural trade patterns and domestic subsidies
18. See JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 2, ch. 10.
19. See POMFRET, supra note 2; THE LEUTWILER REPORT, supra note 2.
20. An interesting example of the friction in Canada-U.S. trade relations caused by Canada's use
of subsidies is found in RALPH H. FoLsOM, MICHAEL W. GORDON & JOHN A. SPANOGLE, JR., IN-
TERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 499-506 (1986).
21. A countervailing duty is a special duty levied on imported merchandise that benefits from the
payment or bestowal of a "bounty or grant." 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(1) (1988). The purpose of the duty
is to nullify the benefits of the "bounty or grant" so the amount of the duty is always equal to that
of the "bounty or grant." William Lay, Redefining Actionable "Subsidies" Under U.S. Counter-
vailing Duty Law, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1495 (1991).
22. To glean an appreciation of the influence of ideology in American subsidy determinations,
see Daniel K. Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of International Trade, 100 HARV. L. REV.
546 (1986). For an articulation of the case against countervailing duties, see Alan 0. Sykes, Coun-
tervailing Duty Law: an Economic Perspective, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 199 (1989).
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aimed at promoting important internal objectives of national policy. 23 While
trade distorting subsidies are prohibited by the GATT, subsidies that achieve
other legitimate national objectives are not. 24 Particularly problematic are those
subsidies that are directed at national domestic policy objectives, but that inci-
dentally affect international trade by creating an incentive to export or by making
it more difficult for imports to compete domestically.
As noted, while the GATT permits the use of subsidies for domestic purposes,
the GATT does not address the resulting tension when such subsidies incidentally
increase exports. Similarly, neither the Canadian nor the American unfair trade
laws actually address this tension. Because of this discrepancy, both governments
find themselves in the awkward position of aggressively challenging the domestic
subsidy program of the other government while simultaneously subsidizing their
own domestic interests.
25
2. United States Law
American unfair trade law recognizes that while all export subsidies are coun-
tervailable, all domestic subsidies need not be. Countervailable domestic subsi-
dies are those available to specific industries rather than those that are generally
available. This distinction is embodied in the specificity standard, which is
defined, by reference, in a case-by-case analysis. This flexibility in analysis is,
however, prone to controversial distinctions between de jure and de facto avail-
ability and has resulted in a wide latitude of discretion exercisable by the ad-
ministering agency as interpreted by the relevant courts.
In the United States, the definition of subsidies for the purpose of counter-
vailing duty law is the result of a long history of judicial interpretation and
statutory amendments. A distinction is drawn between export and domestic
subsidies. Export subsidies are defined by reference to the illustrative list in the
GATT Subsidies Code. 26 The basic difference between export and domestic
subsidies is well established and has been articulated by Powell, Giesse, and
Jackson:
27
The Tariff Act classifies subsidies into two categories: export subsidies and domestic
subsidies. 28 Export subsidies are government programs that grant benefits to domestic
23. See GATT Subsidies Code, supra note 10, which recognizes the validity of domestic sub-
sidies aimed at national policy while acknowledging that some domestic subsidies may cause harmful
effects on trade.
24. See id. at preamble; see also GATT, supra note 2, arts. VI, XVI, & XXIII.
25. See Final Countervailing Duty Determination in the Matter of Fresh, Chilled & Frozen Pork
(Dep't of Comm. 1990) (remand determination), Secretariat File No. USA-89-1904-06, Document
No. 247.
26. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A)(i) & (ii) (1990).
27. See Powell, Giesse, & Jackson, supra note 16, at 236. (The footnotes in the following
quotation are drawn from the original.)
28. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303, 1677(5).
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manufacturers based upon export activity or export performance.29 These subsidies are
analogous to "specific subsidies" in that they usually enable specific corporate indi-
viduals to gain a competitive advantage over, among other entities, U.S. manufacturers
in the U.S. market. . . . Export subsidies per se are countervailable pursuant to the
Tariff Act and the GATT Subsidies Code.3°
Domestic subsidies, on the other hand, are foreign government programs that pro-
vide goods or services either to specific members or groups in a society or to all
members in a society.3 ' In contrast to export subsidies, domestic subsidies are not
contingent upon export activity or export performance. 32 Only those domestic subsi-
dies that grant a preference to "a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises
or industries, ' 33 within the meaning of section 771(5) of the Tariff Act, are counter-
vailable. 34 A so-called "preference" is a foreign government program that provides
specific recipients with goods, services, or financing at prices or on terms more favor-
able than those available to other recipients in the exporting country.35 Examples of
countervailable domestic subsidies include equity infusions and loan guaranties on
noncommercial terms.
The application of a standard of specificity has evolved in the United States
through a series of domestic laws and court cases. Initially, the Department of
Commerce employed a "general availability test" to determine whether a particular
domestic subsidy program promoted the production of specific products and were
therefore countervailable under the Tariff Act.37 The Court of International Trade
(CIT) initially endorsed this standard,3M but then rejected it39 in favor of the so-called
"de facto specificity test. ' '4° A recent amendment to U.S. law codifies this test:
In applying subparagraph A [as regards subsidies] the administering authority. . . shall
determine whether the subsidy . . . in law or fact is provided to a specific enterprise,
or industry or group of enterprises or industries. Nominal general availability. . . is not
a basis for determining that the subsidy is not . . . in fact provided to a specific
enterprise or industry, or group thereof .... ..
This statutory amendment appears to be the codification of the section of the
Cabot 142 decision that rejected nominal general availability as the test for
whether a subsidy is countervailable. Cabot I held that:
29. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A)(i).
30. Id.
31. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A)(ii).
32. Id.
33. Id. (emphasis in original).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.; Michael S. Knoll, An Economic Approach to the Determination of Injury Under United
States Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Law, 22 N.Y.U. J. INr'L L. & POL. 37 (1989).
37. Powell, Giesse, & Jackson, supra note 16.
38. United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 566 F. Supp. 1529 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
39. Cabot Corp. v. United States, 620 F. Supp. 722 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985) (Cabot I).
40. PPG Indus. Inc. v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 258 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987), aff'd, 928 F.2d
1568 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
41. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B).
42. Id.
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The appropriate standard [for determining the countervailability of domestic benefits]
focuses on the de facto case by case effect of [such] benefits provided to recipients
rather than on the nominal availability of benefits. . . . This definition [of bounty or
grant or subsidy] requires focusing only on whether a benefit or "competitive advan-
tage" has been actually conferred on a "specific enterprise or industry, or a group of
enterprises or industries".... Once it has been determined that there has been a
bestowal upon a specific class, the second aspect of the definition of bounty or grant
requires looking at the bestowal and determining if it amounts to an additional benefit
or competitive advantage. If so, the benefit might fit within one of the illustrative
examples of 19 U.S.C. 1677(5)(B). 43
This case-by-case methodology of determining whether a generally available
subsidy, that is, de jure availability, in actual practice results in an advantage to
specific entities, that is, de facto specificity, was upheld in Cabot II, despite
earlier precedents to the contrary. 4 Subsequent to Cabot I and II, the Depart-
ment published two proposed regulations that set forth the standards that guide
its analysis of de facto specificity. 45 The regulations state:
(b)(l) Domestic Programs. Selective treatment, and a potential countervailable do-
mestic subsidy, exists where the Secretary determines that benefits under a program are
provided, or are required to be provided, in law or in fact, to a specific enterprise or
industry, or group of enterprises or industries.
(2) In determining whether benefits are specific under paragraph (b)(1) of this sec-
tion, the Secretary will consider, among other things, the following factors:
(i) The extent to which a government acts to limit the availability of a program;
(ii) The number of enterprises, industries, or groups thereof that actually use a
program;
(iii) Whether there are dominant users of a program, or whether certain enter-
prises, industries, or groups thereof receive disproportionately large benefits under a
program; and
(iv) The extent to which a government exercises discretion in conferring benefits
under a program.4 6
The first factor highlights de jure selectivity, for example, government action to
limit availability of programs. The next three factors, "numbers of users," "dom-
inant users," and "government discretion," provide authoritative guidance to the
investigating agency in determining de facto specificity. The regulation on its face,
however, makes clear that these are not the only factors that may be taken into
account in making the determination. No mention, however, was made of the role
of "competitive advantage," which was cited as an important element in Cabot .
Following the issuance of the proposed regulations, the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, in the PPG case, sought to establish, for the first time, the
43. 620 F. Supp. at 732.
44. Cabot Corp. v. United States, 694 F. Supp. 949 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988) (Cabot 11). Compare
Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 564 F. Supp. 834 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983) with Bethlehem
Steel Corp. v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 1237 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984); see also PPG Indus. Inc.,
supra note 40.
45. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Request for Public Comments, 54 Fed. Reg. 23,366
(May 31, 1989).
46. Proposed 19 C.F.R. § 355.43(b), 54 Fed. Reg. at 23,379. For an authoritative analysis of
the specificity test, see Powell, Giesse, & Jackson, supra note 16, at 242.
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determining factors for deciding whether a specific industry or group of indus-
tries had been given a competitive advantage. 47 The majority opinion noted in
approval the ITA's position that:
the specificity test cannot be reduced to a precise mathematical formula .... [W]e
must exercise judgment and balance various factors . . . of a particular case ....
Among the factors we consider are: (1) the extent to which a foreign government acts
to limit the availability of the program; (2) the number of [entities] which actually use
a program, which may include the examination of disproportionate or dominant users;
and (3) the extent ... government exercises discretion . . . in determining specificity
in a given case.48
The precedential value of this ruling was called into question by the dissenting
member of the three-judge panel by stating that the decision:
threatens to unsettle the law . . . . Nor is concern lessened because there is no opinion
of the court and hence no opinion with precedential force. Since Senior Judge Smith,
while voting to affirm the CIT result, did not join in Chief Judge Nies' opinion, she
speaks only for herself, just as I speak only for myself. This jurisprudential truth,
however, likely will be lost when the bar reads and cites that opinion. After all, facts
and reasons are described and a two-judge result is noted; together, they imply a
precedential holding.49
A subsequent CIT opinion noted that the CAFC in PPG, "was not in accord
over the proper specificity test to be applied, and that there is some question of
the extent of the controlling effect of the single-judge opinion.50 Unfortunately,
in the absence of a decision with precedential value from the court of appeals, the
controversy over the de facto specificity test is likely to continue despite all
attempts to settle the issue.
The court of appeals' willingness to defer to the agency determination in these
circumstances appears to give the relevant agency wide discretion in choosing
which factors it prefers to examine and what weight it will attach to each factor.
Such license can be perceived by another government whose programs are under
scrutiny as a disincentive to the determining agency's willingness to provide
nonbiased, rigorous, and principled analysis. While this should not be read as an
accusation that the relevant agencies have not been completely objective, in the
context of an FTA it may be a cause for some discomfort.
This discomfort came to the fore in the recent binational panel decision con-
cerning Live Swine from Canada,5 1 in which the "competitive advantage" test
was raised and the Government of Canada argued that the de facto specificity test
requires that benefits must be "intentionally targeted" by the government in
order to be countervailable. The panel unanimously held that the department
"applied the correct legal standard, insofar as it does not have to find intentional
47. PPG Indus. Inc. v. United States, 928 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
48. Id. at 1576.
49. Id. at 1580.
50. Roses Inc. v. United States, 774 F. Supp. 1376, 1379 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1991).
51. In the matter of Live Swine from Canada, USA-91-1904-03, at 22 (May 19, 1992).
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targeting and it does not have to make a separate determination of competitive
advantage."
52
While the panel found that targeting was not required53 and no showing of
competitive advantage was applicable, 54 it nonetheless found that the department
may have applied the correct standard improperly:
While the test set forth in Commerce's proposed regulations for determining defacto
specificity (and in Commerce's final determination in the instant proceeding) conforms
to law, Commerce may not base its determinations on a purely mechanical analysis.
"Commerce does not perform a proper de facto analysis if it merely looks at the
number of companies that receive benefits under [a] program." Roses Inc. v. United
States, 774 F. Supp. 1376, 1380 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1991). "It is not the sheer number of
the enterprises receiving benefits that dictates whether or not a program is countervail-
able." Id. at 1384. Rather, Commerce must examine all relevant factors to determine
whether "if, in its application, the program [at issue] results in a subsidy only to a
specific enterprise or industry or specific group of enterprises or industries." PPG
Industries, supra, at 1576 (emphasis in original). To fulfill this requirement, Commerce
must comply with its own proposed regulations, as expressly approved by the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in PPG Industries, Id., and it "must exercise judgment
and balance various factors in analyzing the facts of a particular case in order to
determine whether an 'unfair' practice is taking place." Commerce "must always focus
on whether an advantage in international commerce has been bestowed on a discrete
class of grantees despite nominal availability, program grouping, or the absolute num-
ber of grantee companies or 'industries.' " Roses Inc. v. United States, 743 F. Supp.
870, 881 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990). 5 5
3. Canadian Law
Canadian economic development is replete with examples of government as-
sistance to the private sector. Historically, this assistance was deemed necessary
because the Canadian market was not large enough to provide the returns nec-
essary to attract private investment. While the Canadian market has grown to
about twenty-six million people, the benefits of this growth have been unequally
distributed. Canada maintains a strong central industrial base and less developed
peripheries. In an attempt to equalize the standard of living throughout Canada,
the Canadian governments, federal and provincial, have embarked on massive
regional development and other social programs. These programs have been
subject to countervailing duties under American unfair trade law.56 In fact, one
of the key Canadian objectives in the negotiation of the FTA was the elimination
52. Id. at 15.
53. Id. at 21. The panel cited as instructive authorities, Saudi Iron & Steel Co. (Hadeed) v.
United States, 675 F. Supp. 1362 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987), appeal after remand, 686 F. Supp. 914 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1988); SSAB Svenskt & Staal AB v. United States, 764 F. Supp. 650 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1991).
54. Id. at 25, citing Roses, supra note 50.
55. Id. at 25.
56. The extent of the subsidization that Canadian governments will embark upon is illustrated in
Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork from Canada, USITC Pub. 2230, Inv. No. 701-TA-798 (Oct. 1990)
[hereinafter Pork].
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of "contingent protection" of U.S. domestic industries through the perceived
politicization of the application of U.S. unfair trade laws. 5
Canada's treatment of subsidies is less complicated than that of the United
States, but equally controversial. While Canada has used its countervailing duty
laws sparingly, the agencies that administer those laws appear to wield great
discretion. Section 2(1) of SIMA 58 describes a subsidy as including:
any financial or other commercial benefit that has accrued or will accrue directly or
indirectly to persons engaged in the ... export or import of goods as a result of any
scheme, program, practice or thing done, provided or implemented by the government
of a country other than Canada .. .5
The SIMA further directs that subsidy determinations be guided by Canada's
GATT obligations. 6° As described previously, the GATT Subsidies Code does
not alleviate the inherent tension between domestic subsidies that achieve a
legitimate public purpose and domestic subsidies that may also cause trade
distortions. Thus, the sweeping definition of subsidy and the reference to GATT
in the Canadian statute led one commentator to note that these laws have: "the
potential for being a protectionist weapon in the hands of an overly-aggressive or
retaliatory-minded Department of National Revenue."
61
Despite its aggressive protectionist potential, Canada has only applied coun-
tervailing duties to domestic subsidies in one case, the C&E's final determination
in Subsidized Grain Corn in All Forms, Excluding Seed Corn and Popping Corn
Originating in or Exported from the United States of America (Grain Corn).62
Grain Corn held that in determining whether a program confers a countervailable
subsidy, the two main criteria to be applied are: first, whether the program
provided a financial or other commercial benefit; and second, whether the pro-
gram was targeted.
Grain Corn distinguished a generally available program, which is not coun-
tervailable, from a targeted program, which is countervailable. This standard is
similar to the one articulated by the CIT in Cabot I: "If a program is available
only to certain enterprises or access to the program is limited, either by specif-
ically including or excluding certain enterprises, then the program may be tar-
geted depending on the eligibility conditions or criteria of the program.',
63
57. D.L. McLachlan, A. Apuzzo & William A. Kerr, The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement:
A Canadian Perspective, 22 J. WORLD TRADE, No. 4 (Aug. 1988).
58. R.S.C. ch. S-15 (1985) administrative procedures governed by B.B. 19.6.1(b) the Special
Import Measures Regulations.
59. R.S.C. ch. S-15, (1985) § 2(1).
60. See R.S.C. ch. S-15 (1985) § 42(3)(b), which directs that the Tribunal be guided by
Canada's obligation under the GATr, in particular the GATT Subsidies Code.
61. Kevin C. Kennedy, The Canadian and United States Response to Subsidization in Interna-
tional Trade: Towards a Harmonized Countervailing Duty Legal Regime, 20 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 683, 688 (1988-89).
62. CIT 7-86, opinion dated March 6, 1987, aff'd, 58 D.L.R.4th 642 (Fed. C.A. 1988), aff'd,
74 D.L.R.4th 448 (SCC 1991) [hereinafter Grain Corn].
63. Id. app. I.
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In keeping with Canada's history of supporting regional development, the
Canadian Supreme Court (SCC) in Grain Corn articulated a standard for the
administering authority to use to determine which programs aimed at regional
development were to be targeted. It concluded:
In determining whether a program is regionally targeted . .. consideration is to be
given to the reasons why the program is directed only to certain segments of the
jurisdiction. If a program is directed to a certain region .. because that region is the
only one which could reasonably benefit from the type of programs or that the region
possessed certain characteristics which are unique in the jurisdiction, then the program
may not be considered targeted.64
This regional approach to evaluating targeting seems to be based on an as-
sumption that Canadian regional subsidization programs are a justifiable instru-
ment of government policy and therefore serve as an appropriate standard against
which to measure other countries' subsidy schemes. Moreover, this standard, as
applied by the CITT, is broad enough to allow the administering authority great
latitude in the determination of whether other countries' programs are specifi-
cally provided and targeted and are therefore countervailable.
The CITT appears to have reserved to itself the discretion to determine not only
whether one region or another benefits from particular subsidy programs, but also
which industry or group of industries within a region derive such benefits. This
standard is unlikely to provide meaningful constraints to the finding of counter-
vailability. After all, what region or industry could not stand to benefit, to some
extent, from greater levels of government subsidies and therefore fall outside the
scope of the limited exception to targeting articulated in Grain Corn?
65
In Grain Corn C&E concluded that several U.S. programs were targeted
regional programs and, therefore, countervailable because the benefits conferred
were not unique to the ten states that received them. That is, other states could
have benefitted from such a program. Moreover, C&E concluded that the pro-
gram was targeted, even within the region, because its benefits were not gener-
ally available but targeted to specific crops.6 6
While the standards for determining whether subsidies are generally or spe-
cifically available are similar in both nations, there is no consensus in the area of
targeting. Canadian agencies enjoy broad latitude to avoid the exception artic-
ulated in Grain Corn. The Canadian Government remains committed to the use
of regional subsidies as a legitimate tool to achieve government objectives out-
side the realm of international trade. While both countries share a mutual rec-
ognition of countervailable subsidies in the abstract, this shared recognition does
not transcend its application to regional development, which was a primary
reason the two governments failed to negotiate limits on subsidies in the FTA.
64. Id. app. 1.
65. See id.
66. See id. app. II.
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B. INJURY TO DOMESTIC INDUSTRIES
1. International Law
GATT article V167 authorizes signatory countries to impose antidumping and
countervailing duties upon subsidized or dumped products that cause or threaten
to cause material injury to, or materially retard the establishment of, a domestic
industry. From the inception of the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotia-
tions of the GATT in 1973, it was clear that the issue of material injury would
dominate the discussion. Many participants espoused the belief that the defini-
tion of material injury in the GATT needed to be reaffirmed. Other participants
argued for the imposition of a more stringent material injury test, emphasizing
the causal link between the injury and the unfair trade practice. 68 The resulting
difficult and strained negotiations led to the reluctant adoption of the current
material injury test. 69 The implementation in the United States and Canada of the
material injury test has resulted in unique national rules.
2. United States Law
The Trade Agreements Act of 197970 and the Tariff Act of 193071 govern the
application of the material injury test to imported products. The United States
International Trade Commission (ITC) conducts injury investigations 72 in con-
junction with antidumping and countervailing duty investigations conducted by
the Department of Commerce. 73 ITA must first determine the margin of subsi-
dization or dumping, whereupon the ITC decides whether the domestic industry
or industries in question are injured or threatened with material injury by reason
of the unfair trade practice. The ITC approaches this task in three phases. First,
it defines the relevant domestic industry. Second, it determines whether the
relevant industry is materially injured or threatened with material injury, or the
establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded. 74 Finally,
it looks for a causal link between the injury and the unfair trade practice.7 5
67. GATT, supra note 2, art. VI, 6(a).
68. See GATT, ARTICLE 6 AND THE TOKYO ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATION:
REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF GAT, (April 1979).
69. The GATT Subsidies Code provides in relevant part:
It must be demonstrated that the subsidized imports are, through the effects of the subsidy, causing injury within the
meaning of the agreement. There may be other factors which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry, and
the injuries caused by the other factors must not be attributed to the subsidized imports.
GAIT Subsidies Code, supra note 10, art. 6(4). The identical standard is contained in the GAIT Antidumping Code,
supra note 1I, art. 3(4).
70. 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (1990).
71. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1677, 1303 (1990).
72. 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (1990).
73. Id.
74. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671 & 1673 (1990).
75. For interesting insight on the application of American unfair trade law, see Anne Brunsdale,
An Overview of the International Trade Commission and Its Role in a Possible North American Free
Trade Area, 12 CAN. U.S. L.J. 187 (1987).
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The causal link between the injury and the unfair trade practice is arguably the
most subjective element in the test, and as Commissioner Brunsdale has pointed
out, "frankly, the one in which my colleagues and I most often disagree." 76 This
disagreement is particularly prone to flare up in the context of threat of material
injury determinations, which are based almost entirely on predictions. The extent
to which commissioners can disagree on this issue was exemplified in a review
by a binational panel under the FTA involving New Steel Rail from Canada.7 7 In
New Steel Rail from Canada, Vice Chairman Cass, in a long and articulate
dissent, accused his colleagues of failing to interpret American law consistently
with the GATT, especially by ignoring the requirement that the injury be caused
by the effects of the subsidy or sale at less than fair value.
New Steel Railfrom Canada was instructive in that the ITC split 3-3 in making
an affirmative finding of threat of material injury. Under U.S. law, 78 a decision
by an evenly divided Commission is deemed to be affirmative. The binational
panel that reviewed this determination was also divided on the issue. 7 9 Four
panelists ruled that the ITC's findings that the domestic industry was not mate-
rially injured by reason of imports and that the domestic industry was threatened
with material injury by imports were supported by substantial evidence on the
record and made in accordance with U.S. law. One panelist dissented because he
felt that the plurality failed to demonstrate some new element to change a neg-
ative injury finding into an affirmative threat finding.
The source of this disagreement is the definition of material injury found in
American unfair trade law. Material injury is defined negatively as a harm that is
not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant.80 This language is sufficiently
abstract to yield varying and perhaps competing interpretations by all GATT
Contracting Parties, including FTA partners.
The statute further provides that the threat of material injury determination
shall be made on the basis of evidence that the threat is real and the injury is
imminent and not on the basis of mere conjecture or supposition. However, there
is no clear articulation or quantification of this standard.8 1 The statute does
nevertheless provide a ten-factor test for the ITC to apply when analyzing the
threat of material injury.8 2
Pursuant to the statute, the ITC cannot weigh alternative causes. That is, the
imports need not be substantial or the sole source of the injury. Any injury caused
by reason of the unfair trade practice will provide grounds for an injury deter-
76. Id. at 190.
77. New.Steel Rail from Canada, USITC Pub. 2217, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-297 & 731-TA-422
(Sept. 1989).
78. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(11) (1988).
79. In the matter of New Steel Rail from Canada, USA-89-1904-09/10.
80. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A) (1988).
81. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F)(X)(ii) (1988).
82. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F) (1988).
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mination. Thus, each commissioner is left to pursue levels and trends in attempt-
ing to determine whether a domestic industry is suffering or threatened by ma-
terial injury caused by unfairly traded imports. These determinations of
causation, especially in the area of threat of material injury, are, therefore, based
upon an elusive standard that permits the potential application of inconsistent
standards.83
A binational panel review under the FTA involving Fresh, Chilled or Frozen
Pork from Canada84 highlighted the lack of consensus within the ITC on what
constitutes a threat of material injury. The Commission, with one commissioner
recused, found no present material injury, but split (3-2) on the affirmative
determination of the existence of a threat of material injury. Upon remand from
the panel due to statistical errors, and following the resignation of two commis-
sioners, the Commission again split (2-1) on the question of threat of material
injury by using a somewhat different analysis than in its initial determination. 85
Commissioner Newquist articulated the view of the plurality:
Although it is possible that pork imports from Canada will decrease, it is also likely that
production levels in the United States will decrease. Thus, Canadian imports entering
at a higher level than would be the case absent the subsidies (even if they are not
increasing absolutely) may well, given declines in U.S. production, take an increasing
share of the market.
86
Commissioner Rohr, in joining the plurality decision, confirmed that the threat of
material injury was not necessarily the result of the subsidies: "[T]he impact of
the subsidized Canadian imports is much smaller than many other factors af-
fecting the industry. But the standard I am legally required to apply is whether the
imports will be contributing even minimally . . . to material injury." 87
3. Canadian Law
In Canada, the material injury requirement is traditionally viewed as requiring
a higher threshold of injury than the American standard. That is, material injury,
in the Canadian trade lexicon, is interpreted as something more than any injury
that is not immaterial. Indeed, the recent Canadian Supreme Court decision in
83. For a scathing critique on the growing unilateral use of countervailing duties by the United
States, see Sykes, supra note 22. See also the views of Panelist Whalley outlining the inaccuracies
in the basic data and "incompleteness in the analytical logic" linking cause and effect in Pork, supra
note 56.
84. Pork, supra note 56 (Views on Remand).
85. ITC Determination on Remand, 55 Fed. Reg. 39,073 (Sept. 24, 1990). For an analysis of this
finding, see Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Binational Dispute Settlement Under Chapters 18 and 19 of the
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, An Interim Appraisal, 24 N.Y.J. INT'L L. & POL. 270
(1991).
86. Id. at 318.
87. Commissioner Rohr as quoted in Lowenfeld, id. at 317. For the ultimate result of this
controversial case in which the ITC reversed its threat finding and the U.S. Government lost an
extraordinary challenge proceeding, see In the matter of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork from Canada,
ECC-91-1904-O1USA.
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Grain Corn88 suggests that the administering agency need not be captive to a
liberal trade philosophy.
In Canada, once C&E issues a preliminary determination that there has been
a subsidy or sale at less than fair market value, the CITT must conduct an inquiry
as to whether the practice is causing or likely to cause material injury or retar-
dation. 89 The material injury requirement is broad and may include financial
hardship on the government purse.
This wide latitude in decision-making open to the administering agency was at
the heart of the Canadian Supreme Court's ruling in Grain Corn. On the one
hand, the Court achieved unanimity in its decision; on the other hand, irrecon-
cilable differences in the Court's reasoning remain. The issue before the Su-
preme Court turned on whether the CITI's determination of material injury was
so patently unreasonable as to warrant judicial review. In its ruling, the SCC
adopted an interpretation of the GATT that is susceptible to protectionist manip-
ulation. The Court referred to, and appears to have adopted, the reasoning
followed by the American Court of International Trade in British SteelCorp.90 In
adopting this reasoning, the SCC concluded: "Having regard to the broad word-
ing of the GATT provisions, it was not unreasonable and was therefore open to
the tribunal to make a finding of material injury even in the absence of an
increase in the amount of imports."9 1
Based upon this important Canadian case, the linkage of causation to material
injury under the Canadian standard may be viewed as more stringent than the
American standard; however, there is room for the CITT to deviate from this
standard. While the Canadian standard for material injury traditionally ap-
proached the American standard of substantial cause of serious injury,92 it now
appears to be within the CITT's broad range of discretion to vary this standard.
Given the SCC's broad interpretation of the GATT and its tacit approval of the
CITT's reasoning, it is reasonable to believe that the different standards adopted
by both countries will evolve in response to the changing circumstances in
international trade, particularly if the Uruguay Round of the GATT is success-
fully concluded.
C. PUBLIC INTEREST
Another area in which the U.S. and Canadian systems differ involves the
identification of a public or consumer interest element in the unfair trade pro-
88. Grain Corn, supra note 62.
89. See R.S.C. ch. S-15, (1985) § 42(1).
90. British SteelCorp. v. United States, 61 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1065 (1984).
91. National Grain Corn v. C.I.T., 2 S.C.R. 1324 (at 74 D.L.R. 4th 488) (1990).
92. This is the standard required in section 201 actions codified in 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251, 201(a),
202(c) (1975, amended 1984, 1985).
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ceedings. This could add another dimension to a proceeding that would other-
wise focus solely on the interests of the complaining domestic producers. Ar-
guably, the inclusion of the consumer interest in unfair trade proceedings would
alleviate any claim of latent protectionism inherent in unfair trade proceedings.
Trade policy is determined, to a large extent, through the balancing of gov-
ernmental, commercial, and consumer interests. Continual tension exists be-
tween the interests of consumers, on the one hand, and of domestic producers,
on the other hand. Thus, in theory, domestic policymakers attempt to balance
these competing interests so that the interests of society, as a whole, may be
advanced.
Unfortunately, the built-in advantages of protectionism in the legislative pro-
cess manifests itself in the articulation of the domestic producers' interests at the
expense of the consumer body. That is, well-funded and well-organized producer
interests spend large amounts of money to explain and support their points of
view to top level decisionmakers and the Congress. These well-funded domestic
industry interests can often influence legislation in order to benefit particular
industries at the expense of the less specific and less organized interests sup-
porting freer trade and competition.
93
The benefits of protectionism are often more visible than the benefits of freer
competition, including such visible symbols as well-publicized plant closures or
increasing imports. In the Leutwiler Report, a comprehensive review of the
international trading system endorsed by Arthur Dunkel, Secretary General of
the GATT, the authors noted this problem: "Those who stand to gain from a
particular trade restriction, the workers or owners of a specific industry, are
obviously more visible and vocal than the general body of consumers, workers,
taxpayers and shareholders in export industries, all of whom stand to lose."
94
Furthermore, the costs and benefits of protectionism are generally felt at
different times. The benefits of protectionism appear almost immediately, in the
form of reduced imports, increased profits, and retention of some jobs in pro-
tected sectors. The losses to society caused by protectionism are considerably
more diffuse, in the form of higher costs to consumers, slower economic growth,
higher inflation, and less competitive industries. The final invisible cost of pro-
tectionism manifests itself as international political tension in that deteriorating
trade relations usually precede friction at other levels. Both Canada and the
United States, through their participation in the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds, and
their current attempt to negotiate a North American Free Trade Agreement with
Mexico, have recognized the potential effects of protectionism in the application
of unfair trade law.
93. For a comprehensive investigation into the effects of protectionism, see THE LEUTWILER
REPORT, supra note 2.
94. Id. at 31.
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Canada has formally enacted specific legislation directed at introducing the
public interest element in countervailing and antidumping proceedings. 95 Under
the Canadian system, a legislative attempt was made to balance the considerations
of the public interest in the unfair trade law process. At least one article, which
analyzed the deliberations of the Canadian Parliamentary subcommittee that ex-
amined this legislation, takes the position that the introduction of a public interest
dynamic into the SIMA was a manifestation of the perceived imbalances favoring
domestic producers at the expense of downstream end-users and consumers.
96
Under the SIMA, when a determination of an unfair trade practice is made and the
CITI' subsequently believes that the imposition of a duty is contrary to the public
interest, the CITT reports this finding to the Canadian Minister of Finance for
consideration. 97 If the CITT decides to hold a public interest inquiry, which is not
required in all cases, then any interested person may make representations. 98 To
date, the CITT has decided to address the public interest dynamic very sparingly. 99
Despite the potential to add a strong public interest dynamic to the adminis-
tration of the unfair trade laws, this additional element has not been utilized to
any meaningful degree. Canadian legislators likely were not willing to require
vigorous public interest advocacy in trade proceedings for fear of deviating too
far from the GATT codes.
Further limiting the use of the public interest element in unfair trade proceed-
ings are the strict time limits to which the CITT is compelled to adhere in
rendering decisions.'00 Clearly, the addition of more public interest input in the
proceedings would have the intended benefit of introducing a new dynamic in the
proceeding to counteract the otherwise exclusive focus on domestic producers.
Such input, however, would also have the unintended effect of prolonging such
proceedings, thereby making such procedures susceptible to, at the very least,
the perception of protectionism through delay.
Also worthy of note is that nowhere in the Canadian legislation is the criteria
of public interest meaningfully articulated. The few cases that have interpreted
this section suggest that the public interest component will be used sparingly and
even then will not always result in a report to the Minister of Finance.
10
95. R.S.C. ch. S-15, (1985) § 45.
96. Alan M. Rugman & Samuel D. Porteous, Canadian and U.S. Unfair Trade Laws: A Com-
parison of Their Legal and Administrative Structures, 16 CAN. Bus. L.J. 1, 10 (1989) and 15 N.C.J.
INT'L L. & COM. RE. 67 (1990).
97. R.S.C. ch. S-15, (1985) § 45(l)(a).
98. R.S.C. ch. S-15, (1985) § 45(2).
99. This issue has only been addressed three times. See, e.g., Surgical Adhesive Tapes and
Plasters (CIT-8-89) opinion dated Dec. 4, 1985; Fresh Yellow Onions (CIT-1-87) opinion dated
Apr. 30, 1987; and Grain Corn, supra note 62.
100. An interesting discussion on the public interest component in Canadian Unfair Trade Law
can be found in Rugman & Porteous, supra note 96, at 11 n.33.
101. Of the three cases decided by the CIT on this issue, supra note 99, only once, in Grain Corn,
was a report delivered to the Minister of Finance. The Minister of Finance had the option to reduce
an otherwise hefty duty to accommodate the loosely defined public interest.
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This is not to say that the public or consumer interest is left wholly abandoned in
the United States. In certain instances, for example, the Federal Trade Commission
will intercede in trade matters to raise a public interest component. 102 In addition,
the Import Administration may take into account the public interest in deciding
whether to settle an investigation (see part IV below). 103 However, the representa-
tion of such interests in the unfair trade process remains relatively undisciplined and
subject, to a large extent, to the discretion of the administering agencies.
In sum, although Canada has introduced the public interest dynamic into the
unfair trade law process through legislation, and the Federal Trade Commission
and ITA may consider the public interest in some circumstances in the United
States, the public interest is far outweighed by commercial interests in unfair
trade matters.
III. Procedural Differences
Although the procedures under which the American and Canadian systems
operate are theoretically similar, t ° 4 two deviations deserve mention. The first is
related to the manner by which the administering agency votes on particular
matters. The other concerns the standing of parties to appear and participate in
matters before the administering agency.
When the ITC votes on a particular matter, the vote of all six of its permanent
members is recorded. 105 The CITT, on the other hand, votes as tripartite panels,
drawing from its complement of nine members.' 06 This difference arguably cre-
ates an advantage for the American petitioner before the ITC because when the
Commission is evenly divided, its decision is deemed to be affirmative, resulting
in a victory for the domestic petitioner. 107 No such provision for affirmative injury
findings in the event of an "evenly divided" CITT exists in Canadian law.
The question of standing is also handled differently by the respective systems,
but results in little appreciable difference in the ability of an interested party to
participate in a matter before the respective administering authority. In both
Canada and the United States, a petitioner must represent a major proportion of
producers of the goods. 108 Different practices have arisen concerning how this
standard is applied.
102. See Certain Softwood Lumber Products, 51 Fed. Reg. 37,453 (Dep't of Comm. 1986)
(prelim. affirm.), where the Federal Trade Commission made representations concerning the effects
of duties.
103. 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(dj); 19 C.F.R. § 353.18 (1990).
104. See 19 C.F.R. § 200ff (1991) and R.S.C. ch. S-15 (1985).
105. While this procedure is the usual practice, the Commission may function notwithstanding
vacancies. See 19 U.S.C. § 1330(c)(6), (d)(3) (1988).
106. While this procedure is the usual practice, the CITT has on one occasion voted as a group
of four. See Countertop Microwave Ovens, R. 688, opinion dated June 23, 1988.
107. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(11) (1988).
108. See R.S.C. ch. S-15 (1985), § 42(3); Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(1)(b),
1677(4)(a) (1990).
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In the United States the petitioners enjoy a rebuttable presumption in favor of
standing because the ITA assumes that a petitioner represents a major proportion
of U.S. producers of the like product.'09 This presumption can be overcome only
if the members of the U.S. domestic industry come forward challenging the
petition. The effect of this rebuttable presumption is a relative disadvantage for
foreign producers who may be forced to defend themselves in trade actions
initiated by a substantial minority of domestic producers rather than statutorily
required major proportion of producers of the like product.
No such presumption in favor of standing for domestic producers exists in
Canadian jurisprudence. However, a complainant in the smaller Canadian mar-
ket, which has fewer producers, is more likely to represent a major proportion of
producers of like goods, even absent the presumption." 0 Thus, the standing
requirement, although applied differently by the two systems, may not yield as
great a practical difference in the ability of an interested party to initiate or
participate in a trade action as would appear based on a bare reading of the
relevant statutes and regulations.
IV. Negotiated Settlements
In both the United States" 1 and Canada,1 2 exporters may negotiate an agree-
ment with the relevant administering authority rather than face unfair trade
proceedings. Both the GATT Subsidies Code113 and the GATT Antidumping
Code 1 4 permit unfair trade proceedings to be suspended or terminated, without
the imposition of provisional measures or duties, upon the receipt of satisfactory
undertakings. Both countries have limited the flexibility and discretion of their
administering agencies to apply such measures.
In Canada, such agreements are called undertakings. The use of undertakings
is limited by the statutory requirements that they be negotiated prior to the
preliminary determinations and that such undertakings be comprehensive, con-
clusive, and subject to the scrutiny of importers and Canadian producers." 5
These requirements compel the exporter to contemplate negotiating an under-
taking in the face of an allegation before any hearing on the substance of the
matter can independently verify the charges. Moreover, the exporter is com-
pelled to cooperate with other exporters so that the undertaking can be suffi-
ciently comprehensive and conclusive to satisfy the statute. Even after satisfying
these requirements, the Canadian Deputy Minister of National Revenue for Cus-
109. See Rugman & Porteous, supra note 96, at 4-5; and Fresh Atlantic Groundfish from Canada,
51 Fed. Reg. 10,041, 10,043 (Dep't of Comm. 1986) (final affirm.).
110. See Rugman & Porteous, supra note 96, at 4-5.
111. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673c.
112. R.S.C. ch. S-15 (1985) §§ 2, 49, 2(11).
113. GATT Subsidies Code, supra note 10, art. 5.
114. GATT Antidumping Code, supra note 11, art. 7(i).
115. R.S.C. ch. S-15 (1985) §§ 2, 49(1), (2).
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toms and Excise still retains the discretion to decide whether the issuance of an
undertaking is warranted in a given case. 116
Under the American system 1 7 the administering authority has wide discretion
with regard to negotiating "suspension agreements." 11 8 Suspension agreements
need not be negotiated prior to the preliminary determinations of dumping or
subsidization by ITA, but they must apply to a substantial portion of the imports
in a given investigation. This requirement compels the exporter to cooperate with
other exporters who may not have identical interests and may prevent the suc-
cessful negotiation of an agreement.
Negotiated settlements are a more common form of resolution to unfair trade
actions in many other countries.11 9 Both the United States and Canada are
selective in the application of negotiated settlements to resolve unfair trade
disputes because the settlements are difficult to administer. The Canadian system
appears to be much more restrictive than the American system due to the time
limits it imposes. C&E, however, has become increasingly prone to grant un-
dertakings to American exporters since the implementation of the provisions of
the FrA. 1
20
The consultation and negotiation provisions of chapter 18 of the FTA have
permitted both countries to negotiate settlements of trade disputes much more
easily than was the case before the implementation of the FTA. This trend
appears to have spilled over into the application of the unfair trade laws based
upon the relatively high number of binational panel cases involving antidumping
duties that have been terminated after negotiation of settlements in 1990 and
1991.121
V. Standard of Review
Judicial review is the principal means by which the application of trade law,
on both sides of the border, is disciplined. If the courts are overly deferential to
the decisions of the administering authorities, the agencies may step beyond their
proper roles as administrators of the law. Alternatively, if courts interfere unduly
in the administration of the law by the appropriate agency, then the legislative
intent to create streamlined and specialized procedures for the administration of
the unfair trade laws will be defeated.
116. Id. §§ 49(2), 49(2)(c).
117. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673(c) (1988).
118. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673(b) (1980).
119. See ANTUIMPING LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 15, at 432; Rugman & Porteous, supra
note 96, at 15.
120. See Ellen Beall, Canadian Secretary, Binational Secretariat, supra note 85, at 346. This may
in part explain the disparity in the number of FTA cases administered by the U.S. Section of the
Binational Secretariat relative to the Canadian Section.
121. As of July 31, 1992, out of the nineteen completed chapter 19 matters handled by the
Secretariat, seven were terminated before the panel hearing, two were consolidated, and ten resulted
in final decisions.
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The extent to which the administrators of the law should be subject to the
jurisdiction of the courts is not a new question. Rather, the courts on both sides
of the border have long grappled with it. One author, recounting the history of
this struggle, noted:
[Judicial review] was designed to ensure that the sovereign will of Parliament was not
transgressed by those to whom such grants of power were made. If authority had been
delegated ... to perform certain tasks upon certain conditions, the courts' function
was, in the event of challenge, to check that only those tasks were performed and only
where the conditions were present. 122
As the courts on both sides of the border have striven to achieve the proper
threshold of deference, they have articulated different standards of judicial re-
view. The Canadian system has articulated its standard of review as whether an
agency's determination is "patently reasonable. ' 1 23 The U.S. standard of re-
view, on the other hand, is whether the American agencies' determinations are




In Canada, parties must exhaust their statutory rights of appeal before resort
is made to the remedies of judicial review. Moreover, at times, omnibus legis-
lation will provide rights of appeal. Such legislation may either provide for an
appeal by being silent on the issue, or it may explicitly state that no appeal is
permitted so that the decision of the administering authority is final and binding.
Some legislation will go one step further and explicitly preclude some of the
remedies otherwise made available by judicial review. These provisions are
known as "privative" or "finality" clauses.
Over time, Canadian courts have developed a very deferential standard in the
face of such clauses. The courts have asserted the ultimate residual and historical
jurisdiction of the superior courts to review decisions of administering agencies
in the face of privative clauses where such agencies have exceeded the jurisdic-
tion granted to them by the legislation. Beyond this assertion of the ultimate
review of cases of agency action in excess of their jurisdiction, however, the
courts have been reluctant to review the administering agency's decisions unless
they are not "patently reasonable" interpretations of the law. One commentator
noted: "The courts are entitled to insist upon a minimum standard of rationality
as a condition precedent to the valid exercise of decision-making powers."
125
122. P.P. Craig, Dicey: Unitary, Self-Correcting Democracy and Public Law, 106 L.Q.R. 105,
113 (1990).
123. See R.S.C. ch. S-15 (1985) and Grain Corn, supra note 62.
124. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(A) (1980).
125. J.M. Evans, Remedies in Administrative Law, in 1981 LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA
SPECIAL LECTUREs 429, 465 (1981).
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The Canadian standard of review in the area of trade law regulation was
thoroughly examined recently by the Supreme Court of Canada in Grain
Corn. 126 Unfortunately, a divided SCC was unable to articulate a clear and
unambiguous standard. The SCC's bifurcation turned on a very subtle distinction
involving the precise degree of deference to be accorded an administering
agency. Four members of the SCC, in an opinion written by Justice Gonthier,
ruled that in the presence of a legislative intention that the decision of the agency
be final and binding (that is, under a privative clause), a court will only interfere
with the findings of a specialized agency where it is found that the decision
cannot be sustained on any reasonable interpretation of the facts or law or where
the agency exceeded its jurisdiction. 127
Three members of the Court, in a dissenting opinion written by Justice Wil-
son, articulated the traditional and more deferential view1 28 that asks whether the
tribunal so misinterpreted the provisions of the legislation as to embark on an
inquiry or answer a question not remitted to it. 1
29
Justice Wilson contended that the question to be addressed is not whether the
agency's decision should be reviewed if the conclusions reached were not patently
reasonable; rather, the narrower question should be whether the agency's interpre-
tation of the provisions of its constitutive legislation was not patently reasonable. If
the interpretation of the legislation was patently reasonable, then the inquiry should
come to an end, and the court should not delve into the patent reasonableness of the
conclusions reached by the agency in the administrative process. This distinction is
a subtle one, but its effect is to constrain a court's ability to review an agency's
determination: "If the Tribunal has not interpreted its constitutive statute in a pa-
tently unreasonable fashion, the court must then not proceed to a wide ranging
review of whether the Tribunal's conclusions are reasonable."13
0
As a result of the SCC's decision in Grain Corn, lower courts and agencies
have two lines of authority to follow in the area of standard of review. Under the
traditional test the court's review is a two-step process. First, it must determine
whether the SIMA confers jurisdiction on the reviewing agency. Secondly, if the
finding is positive, the scope of the court's review is limited to a determination
of whether the agency's interpretation of its jurisdiction was patently reasonable.
If patently reasonable, the review should terminate and the courts should not
look to the merits of the decision.
Under the new broader standard of review articulated by the majority in Grain
Corn, judicial review may extend to deciding whether a conclusion or finding by
126. Grain Corn, supra note 62.
127. See id. at 468-91.
128. This stricter view has become known as the "rational basis test" and was explicitly accepted
by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canadian Union of Pub. Employees, Local 963 v. New Bruns-
wick Liquor Corp, 2 S.C.R. 227 (1979), 97 D.L.R.3d 417.
129. See Grain Corn, supra note 62, at 452-68.
130. Id. at 464.
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an agency is patently reasonable, given the relevant provisions of the SIMA
interpreted in the context of Canada's international obligations as manifested in
the GATT. The majority concluded: "I do not understand how a conclusion can
be reached as to the reasonableness of a tribunal's interpretation of its enabling
statute without considering the reasoning underlying it.- ' 13 1
While this new standard of judicial review permits closer security of agency
determinations, it remains a standard that, in absolute terms, is very deferential.
The opinion does not overturn the ingrained judicial deference to specialized
agencies protected by privative clauses. 132 The extent of this ingrained judicial
deference to an agency protected by a privative clause was articulated by the
SCC in an earlier decision:
The tribunal has the right to make errors, even serious ones, provided it does not act in
a manner "so patently unreasonable that its construction cannot be rationally supported
by the relevant legislation .... " The test for review is a "severe Itst." . . . This
restricted scope of review requires the courts to adopt a position of deference .... 133
B. AMERICAN LAW
The American standard of review is set out in section 1516a of the Tariff Act
of 1930. This section reads: "The court shall hold unlawful any determination,
finding, or conclusion, found. . . to be unsupported by substantial evidence on
the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law."' 34
At first glance the substantial evidence standard appears to be much broader
(that is, requiring less deference) than the Canadian standard. The substantial
evidence standard is well established:
"[Slubstantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477, 71 S. Ct. 456, 459, 95 L. Ed. 456 (1951),
quoted in Penntech Papers, Inc. v. NLRB, 706 F.2d 18, 22 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 892, 104 S. Ct. 237, 78 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1983). Accord Consolo v. Federal
Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 619-20, 86 S. Ct. 1018, 1026, 16 L. Ed. 2d 131
(1966). Taking into account" 'whatever in the record fairly detracts' from the [agency's]
fact finding as well as evidence that supports it," Penntech, supra, 706 F.2d at 22
(quoting Universal Camera, supra, 340 U.S. at 487-88, 71 S. Ct. at 464-65), "[tlhe
court may not substitute its judgment for that of the [agency] when the choice is
'between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably have
made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo .... .' " Id. at 22-23
(quoting Universal Camera, supra, 340 U.S. at 488, 71 S. Ct. at 465). 135
131. id. at 491.
132. See Canadian Union of Public Employees, 97 D.L.R.3d 417; Caimaw, Local 114 v. Paccar
of Canada Ltd., 2 S.C.R. 983 (1989), 62 D.L.R.4th 437.
133. Caimaw, 62 D.L.R.4th at 453 (citations omitted).
134. Tariff Act of 1930 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1516(b)(1) (1980)).
135. New Steel Rails from Canada, supra note 77; see also, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
United States, 750 F.2d 927, 933 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Granges Metallverken AB v. United States, 716
F. Supp. 17, 21 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989); National Ass'n of Mirror Mfrs. v. United States, 696 F. Supp.
VOL. 26, NO. 4
U.S. AND CANADIAN UNFAIR TRADE LAW 897
It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept would be
adequate to sustain a conclusion, but the possibility of drawing two inconsistent
conclusions from the evidence should not disturb an agency's finding from being
supported by substantial evidence. Although broadly discretionary to agency
fact-finding, 3 6 this standard is not without limits.
Thus, in determining whether an agency's application and interpretation of a
statute is in accordance with the law, a court need not conclude that the agency's
interpretation is the only reasonable construction or the one the court would have
crafted. 137 The court need only conclude that the agency's interpretation was
reasonable. 1
38
Courts reviewing agency determinations generally follow the principle that the
agency is presumed correct and the burden of proving otherwise is on the party
challenging the correctness of the decision. 139 The courts, however, have also
proved themselves ready to step in and review the cases where agencies, under
the guise of lawful interpretation or discretion, attempt to contravene or ignore
the intent of legislation. 140 The courts have also been ready to review where the
agency has rendered a decision devoid of any rationality. 141
Despite legislative language that appears to give the courts a relatively broad
scope of review, the courts appear to have constrained their review and remain
deferential to the views of agencies. 142 To prevail under the substantial evidence
standard, the plaintiff must show that the agency either erred in the law or that
the agency's factual findings were not supported by substantial evidence.
The extent to which a court will defer to an agency determination can be
gleaned from the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Chevron. 143 Chevron artic-
ulated a two-part test. In the first part, the court must determine whether con-
gressional intent is clear. If it is, then the court need not review the issue further.
If the intent is not clear, then and only then, can the court consider whether the
decision is based on a permissible construction of the statute. In doing so the
court does not impose its own construction on the statute, as would be the case
in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, the court's review is
limited to whether the interpretation is reasonable. The Court held: "We have
642, 644-45 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988); Alberta Pork Producers' Mktg. Bd. v. United States, 669 F.
Supp. 445, 449-50 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987), op. after remand, 683 F. Supp. 1398 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1988); Philip Bros., Inc. v. United States, 640 F. Supp. 1340, 1342 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986).
136. American Permac, Inc. v. United States, 831 F.2d 269, 273 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. dis-
missed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988).
137. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
n.11 (1984).
138. See id. at 845.
139. See Hannibal Indus. Inc. v. United States, 710 F. Supp. 332, 337 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989).
140. See Cabot 11, supra note 44, at 953.
141. See American Lamb Co. v. United States, 785 F.2d 994, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
142. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 511.
143. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive
department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and
the principle of deference to administrative interpretations. .... 144
VI. Conclusion
Although a cursory analysis of the two systems would lead to the conclusion that
very different interpretations of the GATT Codes could mandate irreconcilable re-
sults, the administration of the two systems, in practice, generally leads to similar
outcomes. Both the Canadian and American unfair trade law systems are drawn from
the GATT Codes, but have been uniquely interpreted to leave the administering
agencies a wide latitude of discretion. Both systems have therefore developed pe-
culiarities in the areas of procedure, subsidy and material injury determinations,
public interest, and negotiated settlements. Despite these differences the results
remain comparable. The one element that differs between the two countries is the
standard of judicial review. The Canadian standard of review is much narrower than
the American standard, making the reversal of a Canadian agency determination
much less likely than the reversal of a U.S. agency by U.S. courts.
It will be interesting to watch the evolution of the unfair trade laws as the
Uruguay Round concludes, the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement reaches
maturity, and the two nations embark upon another experiment through the
negotiation of a North American Free Trade Agreement with Mexico.
144. Id. at 844 (citation omitted).
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